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Abstract
The judiciary has excelled in the international and national scene, reaching role of 
great importance, thus creating opposition to the legislative and executive powers. 
The center of gravity of the sovereign power of the state moves toward the judiciary, 
that happens to have a more active role and controlling of the others powers, but 
also appears as a great defender of social and fundamental rights causes, seeking to 
make an effective constitution. Its great public notoriety has attracted great distrust 
of various sectors of society, especially by the two powers that have an increasing 
interference. Arises, therefore, a speech that the judiciary would be reversing into a 
big and uncontrollable power, increasing the suspicion that now it would be living in a 
real dictatorship of the judiciary through judicial activism. There is a growing concern 
with the expansion of activism and the role of the judiciary. The purpose of this work 
is to conceptualize and approach the judicial activism and the state of exception to 
search and reveal if there is any similarity, to then draw up a possible answer to the 
concern of forming a dictatorship of the judiciary. The state of exception is one of 
the rule of law paradoxes, while activism is a political manifestation of the judiciary. 
The similarity between the institutes appears as appalling in a dynamic expansion of 
political power of a state institution exercising judicial function, putting in check who 
would be the sovereign in a rule of law and democratic state.
Keywords: judicial activism; state of exception; dictatorship of the judiciary; policy 
decision.
Introduction 
From 1891, with the creation of the Brazillian Republic and in the years that 
followed until the end of Rui Barbosa’s life, his ideals, that the role of guardian of 
the Constitution belong to the Supreme Court, remain, alongside with the oligarchic 
policy in an environment regarded as liberal and the constant state of siege declared, 
the great political highlight of this historical period. The thought of Rui Barbosa was 
that only a change in the judicial role in relation to judicial review, inaugurating a 
movement in direction to the judiciary, would be able to transform the national reality 
in a truly rule of law State. Rui Barbosa would fight all his life for the judiciary to take a 
more active political role as the great guardian of what he envisioned it should be the 
federal constitution, creating a real constitutional exegesis that would inspire all times 
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to date. This famous scholar of the past was very influenced by the judicial review of 
the supreme US court, always citing the first major case of unconstitutionality on that 
court, Marbury v. Madison in the year 1803.
Rui Barbosa advocated a protagonism of the judiciary in Brazil to inaugurate a judicial 
review in the Supreme Court. His goals were thwarted by oligarchic economic interests, 
the maintenance of power by private interests and constitutional interpretations 
convenient for this purpose. With the inauguration of the republic, the judiciary has 
not changed much from what it was in the system of constitutional monarchy, with 
a kind of secondary to that legislative and executive power who were vying for the 
center of state power.
Crucial to emphasize that with the removal of the figure of the emperor and the reserve 
power, the country entered a phase of competition for filling the gap left in power 
that would attract all the big farmers and businessmen of the time, causing a major 
oligarchic dispute. The military appear in this historic moment in order to contain the 
dispute and end metamorphosing the newborn Republic in something worse than 
the old regime with the constant suspensions of law and Constitutional guarantees 
through the state of siege declaration (species of the genus exception state). In this 
context, Rui Barbosa believed that who could make an effective Constitution and the 
republican dream into reality, would be the judiciary, however, the Supreme Court 
of that time would prove it unable to transform reality dominated by the oligarchy. 
Emblematic in national political history is the threat made  by Marshal Floriano Peixoto 
to the Supreme Court at the episode of the habeas corpus filed by Rui Barbosa, aiming 
the declaration of unconstitutionality of the state of siege decree and the immediate 
release of the prisoners.
In the years following to the end of the Old Republic, this speech and the movement 
towards the judiciary as guardian of the Constitution dissipates, only returning with 
the Constitution of 1988. Since then, the judiciary would assume a role of prominence 
in the political arena, more interventionist, because that would the institutional 
design in the new Constitution of Brazil. With power restored and with the most 
factual democratization, judiciary begins to play a role in the political arena. There is 
an increased confidence in their positions, and their decisions starts being respected 
by the motivation of its foundations. Before 1988, with the judiciary’s inability to have 
a more active role on the national scene, as occurred in other historical moments in 
the centric countries, the political arena was dominated by the performance of the 
executive, the legislature and the strong presence of the military. Numerous states of 
exception were decreed by the executive and the military, making the use of power 
due to force a constant within a constitutional state, without which nothing would be 
subject to control or judicial intervention.
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History indicates that states of exception across the globe were not the work of the 
judiciary and that hardly suffered its share of legality control, being predominantly 
enacted by hypertrophy of the executive power or by what would be the great 
representative of the state, the great leader, the sovereign. This demonstrates the 
secondary character of the judiciary for many years. Only after World War II, is 
possible to observe a rescue of the judicial role. With the recent role of the judiciary 
in Brazil, due to the institutional design, everything becomes liable to assessment 
and control of this power, a phenomenon that, with the concomitant emptying of 
the legislature on the national scene, makes clear its supremacy. The horizontal and 
vertical increase power of the judiciary is viewed with extreme suspicion and mistrust 
by the executive and legislative, that accuses him of monopolizing the interpretation 
of the constitution, and to create a true judicial dictatorship. Various sectors of society 
start exchanging blows on the apparent prevalence of the judiciary, but the speech on 
judicial dictatorship is not something modern.
The political enemies of Rui Barbosa have always used the argument that his thought 
on the judiciary would lead to an establishment of a judicial dictatorship, which 
he would reply stating that the judiciary did not use weapons, possessed neither 
commanded armies, had no militia, not elected presidents or had a proactive role, 
always depending on provocation to express and enforce the law. In his speech on 
November 19, 1914 at the Institute of Lawyers of Brazil (IAB) in Rio de Janeiro, entitled 
“The Supreme Court in the Brazilian Constitution”1, Rui Barbosa addresses this issue 
making it very clear its position on the impossibility of establishment of a dictatorship 
of the judiciary and that there would be no possibility of arbitrariness in the judicial 
decision, given that it was always justified by the strength of their motives and subject 
to appeal.
This movement towards the judiciary, today, brought up a discussion that for years have 
occurred in the United States: the judicial activism. Arthur Meier Schlesinger Jr. was a 
journalist and author who coined the term judicial activism and judicial self-restrain 
in 1947 in an article for Fortune Magazine entitled “The Supreme Court: 1947”. In this 
article the author discussed the activist and self-restraint positions of the Justices of 
that court. Judicial activism is the subject of great criticism, doubts and questions, 
because of its growing and regular application of the judiciary, having various forms of 
expression since its first appearance. The germ of judicial review, and in a way also of 
judicial activism, can be attributed to ‘Doctor Bonham’s case’ in 1610 in England, case 
that would influence the birth of the institute in the United States in 1803, where the 
judicial review and judicial activism would develop and generate numerous studies 
and disagreements to modern days. In Brazil, the constitutional control is introduced 
in the Republican Constitution of 1891 by Rui Barbosa, although activism gained its 
1 Free translation of “O Supremo Tribunal Federal na Constituição Brasileira”.
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contours from 1988 Constitution, which shows how much is new, and still in 2016, 
it’s possible to observe how much it has expanded. It should be clarified that judicial 
review and judicial activism are distinct institutions, not being treated as equals.
Within this political context of the judicial role, could judicial activism be considered 
a concern that could lead to the formation of a judicial dictatorship? In other words: 
it is legitimate the concern that judicial activism would be able to gestate a judicial 
dictatorship? The claim of creating a dictatorship of the judiciary has some scientific 
bias? Or is it a political discourse? The primary objective of this research is to study 
the relation between judicial activism and state of exception. The method employed 
is theoretical and literature review, comparative and qualitative analysis. As specific 
objectives, searchs to: (I) conceptualize judicial activism, judicialization and judicial 
self-restraint, (II) conceptualize state of exception and dictatorship, (III) approach the 
judicial activism of the state of exception, electing comparative criteria to monitor 
whether they are objects in the same or different spaces; being different, see if 
there are any common concepts, and lastly (IV) to make some final thoughts on the 
possibility of gestating a dictatorship of the judiciary.
Activism, Judicialization and Self - Restraint
Judicial activism is a topic that gains space in Brazil between popular debates, among 
scholars of law and in political science. This fact is mainly due to the work of the 
Ministers of the Supreme Court, but do not exhausted in them, having manifestation 
in various levels of the judicial structure. The judiciary has “the task of framing the 
human fact in a legal norm, for it is essential to understand it well, and determine its 
content”2 through interpretation. Constitutional interpretation in the Supreme Court is 
the result of a principled exegesis that has the power, when considering the polysemic 
scope of constitutional principles, to reduce its density at the time of application.3 The 
risk taken is to consider the same principle, at different times, of heteronomous and 
contradictory forms.
In Brazil, the result of institutional designs of the Constitution rises the judicialization 
alongside with judicial activism. Both represent a move towards the judiciary political 
and institutional role, leaving a policy-observer function and passing to exercise a 
political function more interventionist.4 The judicialization and activism can be best 
2 Free translation of “a tarefa de enquadrar o fato humano em uma norma jurídica, para o que é indispensável compreendê-la 
bem, determinar-lhe o conteúdo” in Maximiliano, Carlos. Hermenêutica e Aplicação do Direito. 20ª Ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 
2011, p.11.
3 Moraes, Guilherme Peña de. Constitucionalismo Multinacional: uso persuasivo da jurisprudência estrangeira pelos tribunais 
constitucionais. São Paulo: Atlas, 2015. p. 19-20.
4 Barroso, Luís Roberto. Judicialização, Ativismo Judicial e Legitimidade Democrática. Rio de Janeiro: [Syn]Thesis, vol.5, nº1, p. 
23-32, 2012, capítulo II ‘A Judicialização da Vida’.
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explained by a conjuncture analysis of the legal system and through a sociological 
analysis regarding the population wishes for the realization of rights.5
The Brazilian Constitutitution creates a system in which no injury or threat to any right 
will be removed from the appreciation of the judiciary (indeclinability of jurisdiction 
principle), and every lawsuit will have a sentence that will solve the judicial dispute, 
regardless if there is legislation in the matter. In this case the judge must be based 
on customs, analogy and general principles of law. It is a corollary of the force that 
represents the Constitution for the state that the constitutional rules and principles 
have significance in verticalized grade6, whatever the legal prognosis performed. 
In this sense, any judicial decision must be within the limits of the pre-established 
constitutional framework. It happens that this frame suffers increase by way of 
axiological judicial hermeneutic principles, and may have their power reduced by the 
same route.
Between judicialization and activism, there is an almost imperceptible difference, 
because both institutes are born with constitutionalism. At the same time they are 
very similar, they are also very distant. The modern Brazilian judicialization is the result 
of prior orchestration of the Constitution, which because of being analytical, broadens 
the matters examined by the judicial role and creates the principle of indeclinability of 
jurisdiction7. The movement toward the judiciary, ie, the judicialization is the result of 
this constitutional design. Hence, it becomes possible for the judiciary to intervene in 
basically any national event and other powers, within the limit of the Constitution, in 
order to safeguard the balance between the powers and the guard of the Constitution.
Judicial activism it is frequently confused with judicialization by the fact that both are 
closely linked to the Judicial Power. To defer activism from judicialization is essential 
to examine whether if, in the decision observed occurred a political-normative 
expansive judge attitude beyond the legal text through the use of a creative exegesis. 
The manifestation of activism can be observed within a multidimensional context, 
representing the many ‘faces’ of manifestation of activism as well analyzed by Carlos 
Alexandre de Azevedo Campos8, author who brings a remarkable definition of judicial 
activism, but the classification proposed in his work appears to be so broad that 
basically all judgments become or activism or judicial self-restraint.
[...] i define judicial activism as an expansive exercise, not necessarily illegitimate, of 
political and regulatory powers by judges and courts in the face of other political actors, 
that: (a) must be identified and evaluated according to established institutional designs 
5 Teixeira, Anderson Vichinkeski. Ativismo Judicial: nos limites entre racionalidade jurídica e decisão política. São Paulo, Revista de 
Direito GV, 8(1), p. 037-058, JAN-JUN, 2012.
6 Moraes, ibid., p.19.
7 Article 5º, XXXV of the Federal Constitution of Brazil 1988.
8 Dimensões do Ativismo Judicial no STF. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense, 2014.
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by the constitutions and local laws; (b) respond to various institutional factors, political, 
social, legal and cultural, existing in particular contexts and in different historical 
moments; (c) is manifested through multiple dimensions of decision-making practices.9
Kmiec10 teaches that the US judicial activism phenomenon is perceived and labeled 
in two different ways based on public/political opinion that it has on a particular 
theme: the judicial attitude is seen as good when dealing with fundamental rights, 
human and social, but is labeled as bad when referring to a court decision that creates 
new law, or when it is guided by political interests, or interfere with other powers 
giving the final word. Note that this tagging is not only a feature of judicial activism, 
it comes to how the public interprets the acts and actions of key state political actors, 
not, therefore, something that can define it, as concludes the author. That is why the 
argument of the use of judicial activism gained a lot of strength when there is interest 
in ensuring fundamental and social rights, giving thus space to create a more effective 
constitutional interpretation of rights, able to make the constitution a reality to rather 
than appear to be inapplicable or unobtainable projection. Judicial activism loses 
strength and suffers criticism when the judiciary interferes with the activity of other 
established powers, either by performing an originally legislative activity, or establish 
criteria to executive, as impacting the available budget, or by imposing obligations on 
other powers.
The judicial self-restraint is the result of an opposing interpretation to activism that 
preaches deference to the constitution and the use of prudence11 in the act of judging, 
usually labeled as a conservative attitude of the judiciary. In this mode, the aim is 
to contain the scope of the power of judicial decision, limiting its length to a more 
restrictive interpretation of the law. Here, it tries to hold decision-making power of 
the judiciary within the matters assigned to it, within the meanings of the elaboration 
of the Constitution12 (or amendment as applicable) and to mantain the balance of 
power. The self-restraint is not a non-performance of the judiciary in cases where the 
Constitution gives it such power (would not activism in this case either), it is in fact 
a self-limitation of the act of interpretation of the Constitution, less invasive to the 
other powers and less ‘creative’, in order not to enlarge, reduce, amend or introduce 
meaning to the legal text. The self-restraint seeks to create an interpretation of legal 
texts to prevent a demonstration of power that is characterized as extremely flexible, 
9 Free translation of “... defino o ativismo judicial como o exercício expansivo, não necessariamente ilegítimo, de poderes político-
normativos por parte de juízes e cortes em face dos demais atores políticos, que: (a) deve ser identificado e avaliado segundo 
os desenhos institucionais estabelecidos pelas constituições e leis locais; (b) responde aos mais variados fatores institucionais, 
políticos, sociais e jurídico-culturais presentes em contextos particulares e em momentos históricos distintos; (c) se manifesta por 
meio de múltiplas dimensões de práticas decisórias.” in Campos, Ibid. p.141.
10 The origin and the current meaning of judicial activism. California: California Law Review, vol.92:1441, issue 5, article 4, p. 
1441-1478, 2004, p. 1471-1473.
11 About deference and prudence see Campos, ibid. p. 153-166.
12 An interpretation according to the intention of those who drafted the constitution can be best seen in the North American 
originalism than in the Brazilian case.
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which would allow the appearance of politically oriented decisions13, and / or the will 
of judgments14. The objective is to respect the checks and balances of the constitutional 
system and limiting the scope of the judicial function within the state.
The self-restraint creates a system of interpretation that aims to prevent the spread 
of judicial activism and its state interference, having the main arguments against 
activism:
 - judicial activism is a manifestation of power that is a countermajoritarian 
difficulty, and therefore, hurts the division of powers, the ground that the 
decision itself, made  by unelected judges, would create a new legal standard 
without the announcement of those elected by the people to do so;
 - judicial activism opens the door to the possibility of creating an interpretation 
that sees the occurrence of the jugeds will in the decisions, therefore, allow the 
creation of any court decision according to the will of the judges, bending the 
legal text to what the judge understand is the best and by making flexible the 
law in any direction. Criticism is to the effect that the judiciary would become the 
philosopher-king15, deciding what the moral the country should have and what 
would be best for everyone;
 - the risk of politicization of the judiciary, in considering the social demands 
and any interference with other powers. Legal risks of becoming an essentially 
political body, whose decisions would no longer be essentially legal with political 
effects (undeniably) and would become policy decisions with legal justifications;
 - the judiciary has limits in its institutional capacity while realizing a function of 
state powers. It does not dominate other areas of knowledge that are assigned 
and more typical of other powers. The limits set by constitutional design also 
create obligations to other state powers, and they interpret the law and the 
Constitution otherwise. These limits also appears in the sense that it is not possible 
to master all areas of knowledge, and a judgment would have to recognize that, 
being precautious that its decision may, for example, break economic stability, 
political, or social of the state or of segment of society.
Concerns about activism are extremely valid and can not be dismissed or ignored. Thus, 
the counter-arguments criticism should also be explored and analyzed, respectively, 
although synthetically:
 - the court decision does not hurt the countermajoritarian will, considering that 
the very division of powers would provide sufficient information to do so; the 
judiciary is placed in a role in the constitutional system that would leave him 
13 Kmiec, ibid., p. 1475-1476.
14 Ibidem., p. 1475-1477.
15 Expression created by Plato in his work "The Republic", and used by Justice Scalia, Minister in the Supreme US court when 
deciding the case Stanford v. Kentucky US 492 361, 379 ( 1989).
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as the guardian of the constitution, besides that the judicial decision would be 
democratic within a system that providing for its performance. The role of the 
judiciary in a democratic system can not be confused with majoritarianism.
 - there is no judgment, in the authoritarian or despotic sense of the word when it 
comes to judicial decision, this is because all of its decisions should be essentially 
grounded, having their reasons for being in its justification, not to mention that 
every decision is subject the subsequent control by way of appeal. For obvious 
that there is some discretion in assessing the casu by the magistrate, but that 
is within the limits of the constitutional framework and under the aegis of the 
reasons for the decision.
 - the judiciary is the result of political choices leading up the creation of the 
state and whereas, therefore, it sets out how it will exercise power. Every court 
decision, although taken as legal, also has in its essence a political decision, so it 
is impossible to idealize that there is no political choice by the judge16.
 - the limit of institutional judicial capacity can not be able to fend off a possible 
threat or injury of the right of judicial control, that fact would generate high 
levels of insecurity and uncertainty within the system and put the the judicial 
office into disrepute.
Thomas Sowell17 highlights the importance of understanding that judicial activism is 
exercised when the judge uses sources of extrinsic meanings to that issue sub judice. 
Extrinsic sources can be social, cultural, moral, ethical, economic or any other alien to 
right itself by changing the meaning of the law and turning what would be a strictly 
judicial decision on a much broader sense. The intrinsic sources of meaning would be 
the one that represents the semantic and legal limits of the institute discussed, allowing 
the institute to change internally by the historical context, advancement of legal 
science or through legislative amendment. However, when the change is motivated 
by extrinsic element - without that extrinsic modification completing a legislative gap 
supplementary objects, in this case it would admit their use - to aggregate, changes 
the meaning of the norm or principle, practicing what is called judicial activism. The 
nearest authors of judicial self-restraint do not accept that the judiciary change the 
meaning of law with the use of such extrinsic meanings, accept, however, that do it 
molecularly18, intrinsically.
Guilherme Peña de Moraes19 recommends that illuminate the application of 
self-restraint and judicial activism through five assessment standards for their 
manifestation to be careful and to beacon when:
16 Antagonizes the idea of  judge's neutrality in the thought of Hans Kelsen in “Quem deve ser o guardião da Constituição”. In. 
Jurisdição Constitucional. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003.
17 Judicial Activism Reconsidered. Hoover: Hoover Institution press, Essays in Public Policy (Book 13), 1989,p. 3-12.
18 Ibidem., p. 6
19 Moraes, ibid., p. 21-22.
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(i) discrimination or prejudice - activism or judicial self-restraint as the issue involved, 
or not, minorities subjected to discrimination or prejudice; (ii) popular deliberation 
- activism or judicial self-restraint depending on greater or less popular deliberation 
on the matter; (iii) the functioning of democracy - activism or self-restraint whether 
the issue involves, or not, conditions for the functioning of democracy; (iv) technical 
capacity - activism or judicial self-restraint depending higher or lower ability to solve 
the dispute and, finally, (v) the rights of future generations - activism or judicial self-
restraint as the issue involved, or not, rights of future generations.20 
All descriptions about the phenomenon of the activism above are the most common 
among the authors. In general, all recognize that judicial activism is an attitude of the 
judge. In the center of the discussion, it is observed a strong relationship of judicial 
activism with the separation of powers, conceived in the work “De l’esprit des lois” 
(The Spirit of the Laws) from Montesquieu and the role of the judiciary as function of 
state power. Montesquieu argues the need to create an intermediate state between 
a system of freedom and an authoritarian system (moderate liberalism), but a state 
founded on law (rule of law) through moderate constitutionalism21. The judicial 
activism would then be essentially a manifestation and demonstration of power by 
the judiciary, with expansive trends, and nothing more. The role of the judiciary in a 
modern liberal democracy is what is at the heart of the matter. Carrese22 maintains 
that the judicial activism transports us to a path that suggests the end of liberalism; 
it affects the health of the liberal democratic system, noting that the activism will 
eventually eradicate the parliamentary system and the majoritarian democracies.
Judicial activism is a political decision of the exercise of power of the judiciary, which 
promotes an expansion of the judiciary and creates a highly malleable exegesis of 
signifiers and meanings of the principles and standards, having sources of intrinsic or 
extrinsic meanings23, it is conciliated with the historical moment and political context 
in which it appears and manifesting through a judicial creation with legal force “extra 
legem but intra ius”24.
20 Free translation of “(i) discriminação ou preconceito – ativismo ou autocontenção judicial conforme a questão envolva, ou não, 
minorias objeto de discriminação ou preconceito; (ii) deliberação popular – ativismo ou autocontenção judicial consoante maior ou 
menor deliberação popular sobre a matéria; (iii) funcionamento da democracia – ativismo ou autocontenção conforme a questão 
envolva, ou não, pressupostos para o funcionamento da democracia; (iv) capacidade técnica – ativismo ou autocontenção judicial 
consoante maior ou menor capacidade técnica de resolução do litígio e, ao final, (v) direitos de gerações futuras – ativismo ou 
autocontenção judicial conforme a questão envolva, ou não, direitos de gerações futuras” in Ibidem, p. 21-22.
21 Carrese, Paul. The cloaking of power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the rise of judicial activism. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2003. p. 15-34.
22 Ibidem., p. 261.
23 Sowell, ibid., p. 3-12.
24 Free trasnlation of “extra legem, porém, intra ius.” in Moraes, ibid., p. 21.
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Sovereign and the Exception of State
The state of exception and the rule of law can not live in the same place. While the 
rule of law is directed and organized by laws and regulations in the broad sense, and 
is structured and created by these laws, the state of exception is the exact opposite, 
is the suspension of laws, fundamental guarantees, standards. The state of exception 
exceeds the right, dragging it to one without oxygenation space where he can not 
breathe and manifest, a space where the regulatory forces of law have no validity 
or expressiveness, remaining in an unconscious state. The state of exception is the 
emptiness of law, where the law is not revealed or as littleassumed, but it is also the 
law of the void, where all the actions taken by the vehemence of which causes the 
exception gain the force of law, even not being law. The exception creates a vacuum-
space on the right.25 
 In being modern society provide with its “highly complex structured”26 and consisting 
of the positive laws in the task of reducing complexity, providing the intelligibility 
of possibilities for lawful or unlawful conduct and predictability of applicability of 
global standards, bringing legal certainty to the social system; the state of exception 
is one that breaks with the current legal framework, transmuting the intelligibility 
and predictability quoted in an unguarded area, something called the “indeterminate 
zone”27, where prevails the will - where there is “equality of all possibilities”28.
State of exception is gender among which many species can manifest, as is the case 
of the state of defense, state of siege, federal intervention, martial law, dictatorship, 
totalitarianism, anarchy, even the modern war on terrorism. Giorgio Agamben29 points 
in the direction that the state of exception and the rule of law can not live together 
because they are opposites. However, the author says that while there is decreeing 
forecast the state of exception within a state of law, the state of exception becomes 
state paradigm.
When speaking of the state of exception, it’s necessary to pay attention to those 
who have the power to decide on their existence. One who can declare the state of 
exception is also one that gathers conditions and powers, who is credited as being 
sovereign, becoming substantively sovereign as long as the exception remains. In 
25 Agamben, Giorgio. Estado de Exceção. 2ªEd. rev., São Paulo: Boitempo, 2011, p. 9-63.
26 Free translation of “Alta complexidade estruturada”, in Luhman, Niklas. Sociologia do Direito 1. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Tempo 
Brasileiro, 1983. p. 12.
27 Free translation of “zona de indeterminação”, in Agamben, ibid., passim.
28 Free translation of “igualdade de todas as possibilidades”, in Luhman, ibid, p.13.
29 Agamben, ibid., p. 9-49.
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other words “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception”30. Carl Schmitt31 argues 
that the sovereign power (the greatest power of all) is one who has the last word 
in defining when it is in conflict, which is the public interest, or what is the state of 
interest, which constitutes public order, which is public safety. Thus, the exception 
would be the recognition of an external danger and how to eliminate it, considering 
that there is no provision in the law to deal with this fact. Schmitt32 indicates that the 
liberal constitutionalism is unable to cope with these external problems, and that the 
system of checks and balances is insufficient, making it clear to the author that in 
these situations, the sovereign would be one that would decide on how to deal with 
the facts. So do because the sovereign is outside the control of the law and at the 
same time belongs to this order, “Although he stands outside the normally valid the 
legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether the 
constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety.”33.
Carl Schmitt34 argues that “What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited 
authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing order”35 and that 
this justifies the very existence of the state. In this situation, the state would be 
perpetuated where the law succumbs; therefore, the existence of the state is higher 
than the existence of the legal system. The decision to break the law eliminates the 
limits imposed by the legal embarrassment and redirects all absolute state power in 
certain nomos, to the one who decides. Schmitt36 says that every law is situational and 
that sovereignty is absolute, so it’s necessary to preserve the power of the sovereign 
and hence the state. This phenomenon happens by the presence of state of necessity 
of the state itself, a theory that justifies the existence of the state of exception in 
Schmitt37. The power to decide this necessity is, at a given historical moment, what 
characterizes the sovereign power, creating the exception and the state.
The Schmittian thinking about the exception is that it is fundamental to the existence 
and maintenance of the state. Agamben38 brings the opposite idea that the exception 
30 Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 5.
31 “From a practcal or theoretical perspective, it really does not matter whether an abstract scheme advance to define sovereignty 
(namely, that sovereignty is the hightest power, not a derived power) is acceptable. [...] What is argued about is the concrete 
application, and that means who decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, 
public safety and order, le salut public, and so on. The exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be 
characterized as a case of extremil peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed factually 
and made to conform to a preformed law.”, in Ibid., p. 6.
32 Ibidem, p. 7.
33 Ibidem., p. 7.
34 Ibidem., p. 12.
35 Ibidem., p. 12.
36 Ibidem, p. 13
37 Agamben, ibid., pg.40-49.
38 Ibidem., p. 83-98.
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is not compatible with the rule of law, supporting much of his argument in clashes 
between Benjamin and Schmitt.
The existing mismatch between the state of exception and the rule of law derives 
from the fact that with the creation and stabilization of state law, this happens to 
be governed by the law that created it, and the state of exception originates and is 
maintained through political act only. Agamben39 argues that the state of exception, as 
being an act of political expediency, it can not be transformed into a legal act and that 
the forecast of the exception in modern constitutions is the most current paradox.
The concept of dictatorship depends on understanding what the state of exception 
is, but invariably it is an exception plus a purpose. Schmitt40 creates a distinction 
between what he calls the dictatorships commissary and sovereign. The commissary 
dictatorship or constitutional dictatorship is defined with the the suspension of the 
legal system in order to preserve the current constitutional order, until it meets 
the necessary conditions to allow its implementation or realization. The sovereign 
dictatorship is the one that breaks with the previous law, suspending it and removing 
it with the aim of creating a new constitution and a new legal system. Fundamental is 
to realize that “... the distinction between law norms and norms of realization of the 
right to the commissary dictatorship, and the distinction between constituent power 
and constituted power to the sovereign dictatorship...”41 are essential features of the 
distinction made  by Carl Schmitt.
By an Approach between Judicial Activism and State Exception
To achieve a confrontation between the state of exception concepts - and their species 
- proposed and the concept of discoursed judicial activism, and perhaps establish a 
relation, it’s needed to highlight the differences, observe proximity conceptual in 
both, electing some criteria that could allow a comparative analysis, to then find out if 
both are in the same existential plane or in different planes. In being in various fields, 
see if there is any merger between them or intersection points. Advancing from the 
previous topics, now, to designate five compared criteria.
The first criterion (1) part listed relates to the appearance of the institutes: a) judicial 
activism arises within the rule of law; b) the state of exception arises within a rule of 
law.
39 Ibidem., passim.
40 Apud Agamben, Ibid., pg. 53-56.
41 Free translation of “... a distinção entre normas de direito e normas de realização do direito para a ditadura comissária, e a 
distinção entre poder constituinte e poder constituído para a ditadura soberana..”, in Ibidem, p. 54-55.
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The second criterion (2) is chosen as the place to where it directs the manifestation, 
for where it walks: a) judicial activism manifested in the rule of law and stays there; 
b) the state of exception breaks the rule of law, walking away from it.
The third criterion (3) is about who decides about their existence: a) judicial activism 
is produced by the judiciary, which is therefore who decides about their existence and 
the only one who can control it; b) the state of exception is created by the sovereign 
to decide on their applicability and convenience. Typically, implementation is given by 
the head of the executive and, in Brazil, with the authorization of the legislative.
The fourth criterion (4) would be about the decision that originates the institutes: 
a) judicial activism is the result of a political and legal decision; b) the state of exception 
is created by a political decision.
A fifth criterion (5) would have to be for the purpose of the institutes, which is held 
here synthetically and even operating certain reductionism, given the complexity that 
would address this point: a) the purpose of judicial activism appears to be a turbid 
element, little explored in the literature, but it could be highlighted the issue of 
responding to a social demand for realization of the rights and even the purpose of 
political and institutional supremacy; b) the purpose of the state of exception, in the 
form of commissary dictatorship, is go away from the rule of law in order to keep it, 
or protect the current constitution by way of exception, the sovereign dictatorship 
mode is to suspend the rule of law, lacerating the previous constitutional order, with 
the intent to open a new one.
The first criterion for compatibility, both appear within a rule of law. The third criterion 
already shows incompatibility, that considering that the judiciary is not the sovereign. 
The second, fourth and fifth criteria need to be further clarified for better observation. 
There is a certain similarity between the second and fifth criterion, but the difference 
is about the space that manifests itself (second) and the reason for your application 
(fifth).
The criterion that needs to be watched carefully is the fourth, which is able to 
determine what is meant in the second and fifth criterion. That occours in the second 
criterion because the possibility of similarity, or equality, would cause the activist 
decision broke with the rule of law temporally, beginning another by decision. 
The fifth criterion could do similar analysis, for the purpose of activism would be 
shifted to the state of exception, making the judicial activist decision to choose your 
purpose. Understand what it means decision; political decision and legal decision are 
fundamental to advance the analysis.
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Legal decision
According to Luiz Flávio Autran Monteiro Gomes42 “decision is the process that 
leads - directly or indirectly - to the choice of at least one among different alternatives, 
all these candidates to address a certain problem”. Claudia Servilha Monteiro43 points 
out that the decision is made by 3 steps: deliberation, choice and execution. In the first 
stage, the agent considers all the available options, and then makes a choice among 
them and then finally executes it.
In the legal decision, a series of other disciplines directly influence, such as values 
of metamathematics, economics, legal hermeneutics, morality, philosophy, theory of 
legal argument, the theory of the application of the law.44 In this indistinguishable 
moment, it is necessary to know how to make the decision. Here, the debate is about 
the degree of freedom that can print on a court decision and what are the disciplines 
that can influence decision-making, especially for the fact that the decision to be taken 
is coming from a public authority, which is a power of certain legal system45. Cláudia 
Monteiro46 makes a historical briefing about the applicability of decision theory, 
rescuing the fact that the court decisions, in its early days, were observed in the 
judge-priest authority. In that historical stage, the decision stands out for its 
“willingness of judicial decisions agents to act on the intricacies of the castration 
language, retention, entrenchment and impediments”47, and for the solipsistic judge, 
autopoietic and isolated from the world.
In the modern Democratic countrys, there is a rescue of the ideals of Enlightenment 
justice (the Enlightenment is influenced by canon law, Roman law, the rationalist 
humanism and the system common law)48 to the figure of the court decision, as well 
as a concern for legitimacy and Legal security. The point moves to the degree of 
discretion that the borrower of the court decision can accomplish.
According to Streck49, discretion is the same as arbitrary, decisionism, something that 
is not consistent with democratic rule, with the court decision having their cause and 
their goals justifieds. It allows the existence of room for legal interpretation and not 
for the judicial creation of the judge’s will. This is because the political will, moral and 
42 Teoria da Decisão. São Paulo: Thomson Learning, 2007, p. 1.
43 Fundamentos para uma teoria da decisão judicial. Anais do XVI Congresso Nacional do CONPEDI. Florianópolis: Fundação 
Boiteux, 2008, pg. 6104-6125.
44 Ibidem, p. 6106-6112.
45 Ibidem, p. 6114-6115.
46 Ibidem, p. 6115.
47 Free trasnlation of “predisposição dos agentes das decisões judiciais para atuarem sob os meandros da linguagem da castração, 
da retenção, do entricheiramento e dos impedimentos”, in Ibidem, p. 6115.
48 Ibidem, p. 6116-6117.
49 O problema da decisão jurídica em tempos pós-positivistas. Novos Estudos Jurídicos, [S.l.], v. 14, n. 2, p. 03-26, out. 2009. ISSN 
2175-0491.
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personal conviction of the judge does not matter to the court application, otherwise 
it would institute will to power50 of the judge. This author indicates that the major 
problem is the subjectivism of the court decision, and the support of the procedural 
theories and theories of argumentation, stressing that they did not overcome the 
problem subject-object51,  which helps to create individualist judges and exclusive 
holders of hermeneutics52. This high degree of subjectivity of the judges, would make 
the court decision malleable, and would create an unsafe area. The malleability is 
observed by the possibility, created by subjectivism, to allow the creation of the 
decision in accordance with the personal discretion of the judge, according to his 
convictions. Streck53, aiming to turn away subjectivity, proposes: (a) the redemption of 
principled prospectivity of the Constitution; (b) recognition of the moral internalized 
in the law created by the legislature (not created by the judge); (c) the court decision 
becomes rationalized by the principles of the Constitution and not the judge’s will; 
(d) the need to state reasons and justification of decisions.
Claudia Monteiro Servilha54 also highlights the need to state reasons and justification 
of judicial decisions, indicating its rationality (Theory of Rational Decision) and 
acceptance (trust) of society. Therefore, it points out that the judgment suffers from 
two types of controls: internal - related to appellate law (basis of the decision) - and 
external - consistent with the control exercised by society. Note that when external 
control is evident, there is a search for democratic legitimacy of the judiciary.
Political decision
Carl Schmitt55 teaches that “the concept of the State presupposes the concept of the 
political”56 and that the concept of political is not adequately explored in the literature. 
The author start of the antithesis ‘friend-enemy’ to seek to define what would be the 
essence of the political. Schmitt points out that the state is composed of the culture, 
morality, ethics, religion, Law, economics and many other elements, and that all of 
them would be interconnected. None of these elements are necessarily political and 
some of them are said to be apolitical (eg. Law and economy)57. He also highlights the 
modern difficulty of discussing what would be political by the fact that the moderns 
liberal constitutional states, are plural and democratic, and that dilutes what would 
50 Ibidem, p.12.
51 Ibidem, p.13-15.
52 Ibidem, p. 19-20.
53 Ibidem, p.21-23.
54 Ibid., p. 6119-6120.
55 O Conceito do Político/Teoria do Partisan. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 2008.
56 Ibidem., p.18.
57 Ibidem., p. 25.
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be political, transforming enemies into adversaries, so it makes the very state system 
becomes debatable58.
Schmitt59 states that the concept of political has its own categories that determine, and 
that is necessary to distinguish political from other manifestations of human thought 
and action, such as moral, aesthetic and economic. Therefore, elects to differentiate 
between friend-enemy, not as a conceptual definition, but as a criterion. It points out 
that the distinction between friend and enemy is essentially political to be coming 
from a riddled tilt subjectivism. To this end, doctrine stating that the difference 
between good and evil (moral), ugly and beautiful (aesthetic), useful and harmful 
(economy) can not be confused with the political differentiation of friend-enemy, 
since the differentiation of them gives from another viewpoint (cultural, scientific, 
secular). The opposition between friend and enemy lies in the political distinction 
to recognize who is friend or enemy, thus, he recognizes the common psychological 
association of an ugly enemy, evil and harmful. Concerns here to understand that the 
political separation between friend-enemy is a highly a subjective appreciation, and 
can be highly contaminated with an economic objective, personal, or otherwise. The 
essence of this choice is political60. However, the author recognizes the possibility of 
using moral base, religious, economic, ethnic or any other, to practice a political act, 
provided that unit of thought and possibility to elect the friends and enemies.
Every religious opposition, moral, economic, ethnic or any other category becomes a 
political opposition when it is strong enough to group human beings effectively between 
friends and enemies. Political lies not in the fight itself [...] but, as already said, in a 
determined by this real possibility behavior, clear understanding of their situation thus 
determined and the task of distinguishing between friend and enemy.61
The plurality of modern States, takes Schmitt62 to recognize the possibility of multiple 
political groupings, not necessarily convergent. These groups can come together 
properly or not, but its existence would make the governance of the state was labored. 
The fundamental reasoning of the distinction that carries regard is the possibility of 
only one group can, indeed, make a political decision, and this is accepted by the other 
members of society. In this case, only this group would take the political decision, 
deciding on whom the enemy is, closing in the rest of society the power of political 
58 Ibidem., pg. 24-27 e 39-48.
59 Ibidem., pg. 27.
60 Ibidem., p. 27-29.
61 Free translation of “Toda contraposição religiosa, moral, econômica, étnica ou de qualquer outra categoria transforma-se em 
uma contraposição política quando é forte o suficiente para agrupar os seres humanos efetivamente entre amigos e inimigos. O 
político não reside no combate em si[...] e sim, como já dito, em um comportamento determinado por essa possibilidade real, na 
clara compreensão da própria situação assim determinada e na incumbência de distinguir entre amigo e inimigo.”, in Ibidem.,p. 39.
62 Ibidem., p. 39-47
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when there is acceptance. According to Schmitt “Political is, in any case, always the 
group that is guided by the critical case”63 and
[...] Is always the human group normative and therefore, the political unity whenever it 
exist absolutely, being a regulatory unit and “sovereign “ in the sense that, by conceptual 
necessity, the decision on the legal case, even when it is an exceptional case, there will 
always be to reside in it.64 
Reflection criteria 
Judicial activism is a result of a political-normative decision, while the state of exception 
is of a political decision. It turns out that, as stated earlier, every political decision has 
a degree of normativity, and hence, judicial activism denotes resemblance to the state 
of exception as the fourth criterion. With the fourth criterion set, the second and 
fifth criteria were riddled by it. The purposes of the institutes (fifth criterion) become 
very close, perhaps interconnected, behold, the result of a political decision. Only 
the political decision would demonstrate the purpose of the institutes, being creative 
element of power and normative definition. The hypothesis that judicial activism 
break for a moment with the rule of law would prove, causing a convergence with 
the state of exception, precisely as the second criterion. There is no equality in the 
third criterion as the judiciary is not the sovereign in Modern States, but is in degree 
of apparent prominence because of activism. The first criterion, as already stated, is 
identical in both.
Overall, there are great similarities between judicial activism and the state of exception, 
with two of the five identical criteria (1 and 4), a non-identical criteria (3, but not 
in opposition) and two very approximate criteria (2 and 5, share of interconnected 
elements, but not completely identical).
Final Considerations
The work is successful in presenting a concept of judicial activism and the state of 
exception, although they have not been explored in all it forms of manifestation. 
The proposed approach between the institutes is presented as a close glimpse of 
the institutes by means of political decision present in both. The ability to create an 
exception state through judicial activism seems to be a hasty view, to the extent that 
trust is also a key element of the exercise of judicial power, and the very existence of 
modern states, an element that was not treated here. That confidence would allow 
the possibility of the coercion of legal decisions (even political ones). By a need for 
democratic legitimacy of the judiciary, the court decision needs to be based and 
63 Ibidem., p. 41.
64 Free translation of “[...]é sempre o agrupamento humano normativo e por conseguinte, a unidade política sempre quando 
existe em absoluto, sendo a unidade normativa e “soberana” no sentido de que, por necessidade conceitual, a decisão sobre o 
caso normativo, mesmo quando este for um caso excepcional, sempre haverá de residir nela.”, in Ibidem., pg. 41.
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justified; for the future, it should be considered the possibility to increased democratic 
participation for setting values  for the hard cases.
It would be frivolous to state that they are identical institutes. They are on differents 
planes of existence and do not manifest themselves similarly, although they have 
interconnected and similar elements. The gestation of a dictatorship, in a Schmittian 
sense, through judicial activism, depends on how the judiciary could grow as a 
political power. The Brazilian proposal is that its Supreme Court is the guardian of 
the Constitution, however, does not mean that he is its master. Concern over judicial 
activism translates into a real concern and not only apparent, an established political 
power passing to want to establish politically, ie, a power that goes on to become 
essentially political, choosing his enemies and his friends, through the choice of moral 
values, economic, legal innovations. The most worrying fact is the absence to suffer 
any control, as if the members of the judiciary were angelic beings higher than the 
land dilemmas and incorruptible.
Despite the frightening similarities between the institutes studied, a dictatorship 
of the judiciary could only be understood in the sense of arbitrariness in the act of 
deciding and creating normativity. Judicial activism is presented as something of 
legitimate concern, as the exercise of political power beyond agreed. Controlling 
the judicial activism is essential to avoid an exponential growth of the power that it 
comes. However, this affirmation should not be confused as the limitation of judicial 
action, what it said is that it is vital to contain it, delimiting a manifestation of power, 
preventing from becoming the own political state.
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